Instead of paying just compensation for the Black Hills as the fifth amendment requires,' 4 Congress promised to feed and clothe the Sioux, "until the Indians are able to support themselves."'" This, too, was no unqualified pledge; the condiArticle 16 provides that "[TIhe United States hereby agrees and stipulates that the country north of the North Platte river and east of the summits of the Big Horn mountains shall be held and considered to be unceded Indian territory, and also stipulates and agrees that no white person or persons shall be permitted to settle upon or occupy any portion of the same; or without the consent of the Indians, first had and obtained, to pass through the same. . . ." The article 16 territory consisted of about 25 million acres, including some of the best Sioux hunting grounds in the Powder River Valley in Wyoming and Montana. Article 11 lands amounted to another 25 million acres, approximately, so that in all, the Sioux possessed rights to some 50 million acres of land outside their permanent reservation. See 97 Ct. Cl. 627-28. See also Brief for Sioux Nation at 14-17, notes 10 and 12, United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980 tions imposed put the Sioux at the mercy of the government. 6 For these wrongs, the Sioux have suffered greatly, as have other Indian tribes forcibly removed 7 from lands they had occupied for hundreds, and for some tribes, thousands of years.'" The Sioux lawsuit over the taking of the sacred Black Hills vividly demonstrates how long and difficult the road to justice has been for Indians. For the Sioux, it has required four special acts of Congress,'I more than ten million dollars in attorneys' fees, 20 and fifty-seven years in court."' The National Law Journal said: "Indian law attorneys agree that the Sioux case is in a class by itself. ' 22 In terms of monetary damages, United States v. Sioux Nation 3 is by far the largest judgment in the 32-year history of the Indian Claims Commis-16. Id. This "promise" was subject to three additional limiting conditions contained in article 5 of the Act of 1877:
(i) rations would be issued only "upon full compliance with each and every obligation" imposed upon the Sioux by the 1877 Act;
(ii) "whenever schools shall have been provided by the Government for said Indians, no rations shall be issued for children between the ages of six and fourteen years (the sick and infirm excepted) unless such children shall regularly attend school"; and (iii) " [w] henever the said Indians shall be located upon lands which are suitable for cultivation, rations shall be issued only to the persons and families of those persons who labor (the aged, sick and infirm excepted;)." 17. Indian "removal" is a term descriptive of a period in the nation's history occurring between 1789 and 1850. See text accompanying notes 63-69 infra.
18. There is some disagreement as to the length of time the Indians have inhabited North America. The most generally accepted theory is that the American Indians traveled from Asia across the Bering ice bridge some 8,000 to 28,000 years ago. D. HOPKINS, THE BERING LAND BRIDGE 373 (1967) . Hopi and Zuni ancestors inhabited the Southwest at least 3,000 years ago. J. GOODMAN, AMERICAN GENESIS 196 (1980) 20. These fees were, of course, on a contingency basis. 25 U.S.C. § 70n (1976) would not only have their day in court, they would have their own special court. While this represented a quantum step in correcting the many historical wrongs inflicted upon the various tribes, it did not eliminate evidentiary and burden of proof problems," as the Sioux would discover when the Indian Claims Commission dismissed their claim in 1954;36 nor did it overcome the extraordinary power of Congress to manage Indian affairs.
Plenary Power: An Absolute Power Unless Subject to Judicial Review "The history of federal dealings with the Indian people has much too often been rule based on power, rather than on consent of the governed."" This power was symbolically demonstrated for the Sioux when the likeness of Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and Theodore Roosevelt were carved in colossal dimension on Mt. Rushmore in the Black Hills.
Plenary power is defined as "authority and power as broad as is required in a given case." 3 It is whole, complete, and exclusive power, but it is not absolute. Yet judicial deference to Congress' plenary power over Indians has rendered that power virtually unlimited. 3 9 Sioux counsel did not question the power of Congress to take the Black Hills, only the power to do so in derogation of the fifth amendment. 4 0 As Sioux counsel summarized, "The concern of this case is with just compensation, not good and evil. ' 42. Indians are expressly mentioned three times in the Constitution. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 gives Congress the power to "regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." Art. I, § 2, cl. 3 and amend. XIV, § 2 exclude "Indians not taxed" from the count for determining congressional apportionment. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, the treaty-making power, implicitly extends to Indians. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, Congress' power to "pay the debts" and provide for the "general welfare of the United States," has been extended to Indians, and is discussed in Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 401.
[Vol. 8 https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss2/11 SPECIAL RECENT DEVELOPMENT and case law are all sources. 3 Ironically, the greatest power over Indians derives from the doctrine of trust responsibility enunciated by Chief Justice John Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia." Subsequent cases demonstrated just how extensive that power had become. In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 4 " referred to in Sioux Nation as "the Indians' Dred Scott decision,"" the Supreme Court found that on the basis of Congress' role as guardian for its Indian wards, "Congress possessed a paramount power over the property of the Indians." 47 In Sioux Nation, the government relied almost exclusively on Lone Wolf, arguing that Congress has virtually unreviewable power to dispose of Indian lands when acting as guardian and trustee "for the Indians' benefit." 48 While the standards of justiciability for Indian claims had left the Supreme Court powerless to intervene on behalf of the Sioux in two earlier attempts with the same claim, 4 9 the Court has found its own voice and now holds that an objective view of the 1877 Act reveals that Congress acted not as a guardian but a conqueror. 5 0
While the Court in Sioux Nation found Lone Wolf inapplicable, it rejected Lone Wolfs presumption of congressional good faith." In this way, Lone Wolf still stands as the fountainhead of Congress' plenary power over Indians, but it is no longer a barrier to reasonable inquiry of long-past deeds of the government. In rejecting the presumption of congressional good faith, the Court in Sioux Nation held that:
[W] hether a particular congressional measure was appropriate for protecting and advancing a tribe's interests, and therefore not subject to the Just Compensation Clause, is factual in nature, and the answer must be based on a consideration of all the evidence presented. While a reviewing court is not to second-guess a legislative judgement, the court is required, in considering whether the measure was taken in pursuance to Congress' power to manage and control tribal lands for the Indians' welfare, to engage in thorough and impartial examination of the historical record. A presumption of congressional good faith cannot serve to advance such an inquiry. 2
The Age of Colonialization and Conquest
Because it is the dictate of the Supreme Court that "a thorough and impartial examination of the historical record" be made," and because the 1877 Act cannot be fully appreciated without an understanding of the historical basis of federal Indian policy, the following summary of events is offered.
Shortly after Columbus "discovered" the New World, Spain and Portugal signed the Treaty of Tordesillas, with the Pope's blessing, establishing a Spanish and Portuguese division of the world. 54 Indians were considered heathens, to be subjugated to the will of their "discoverors."" Title to lands in the New World would accrue upon discovery or conquest. 6 As international law principles developed, the rights of Indians were recognized. Franciscus de Victoria,7 whose lectures form the basis of international law, argued in the 1520s that Indians were human beings, and that their possession of land should be respected, even where no formal deeds or treaties existed. He maintained that the Treaty of Tordesillas could serve only as establishing zones for trading and proselytizing, not as a distribution of land." Our respect for Indian title and occupancy can be traced to these Spanish origins."
In 1625 the first deed of Indian land granted to English colonists was signed by Chief Samoset, a Pemaquid, giving 12,000 acres to the first settlers at Plymouth Rock. 60 [Vol. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss2/11 SPECIAL RECENT DEVELOPMENT two years later, in one of the first great acts of our Congress, the Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 1787, declared:
Art. 3 . . .The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their land and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall, from time to time, be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them. 6 This high standard was incompatible with the insatiable territorial demands of the huge tide of European immigrants, as they settled outward from the original colonies. 6 2 Thus, voluntary cessions by the Indians became virtually impossible. The response of the government was to effect a policy of Indian removal, and between 1789 and 1850, 245 treaties were imposed on the Indians, transferring ownership in 450 million acres of land at twenty cents an acre. 63 By the 1830s Indian relations were in a state of chaos. Lewis Cass, the then secretary of the war department, which was in charge of Indian affairs, stated in his annual report that "[a] crisis in Indian affairs has evidently arrived which calls for the establishment of a system of policy adapted to the existing state of things, and calculated to fix upon a permanent basis the future destiny of the Indians. ' Before the ink was dry, Congress moved this "permanent Indian frontier" from the Mississippi to the 95th Meridian, another 200-300 miles farther west. 7 The treatment of Indians in this period of President Andrew Jackson's accelerated Indian removal is one of the most shameful chapters in our history and is a stain upon the national honor that can never be completely erased. In the South, Choctaws, Cherokees, Chickasaws, Creeks, and Seminoles were forced to give up their homelands. Bitter and expensive War Department operations were implemented to effect the removal policy." Cherokees were put in prison camps, then marched along the infamous "Trail of Tears," where one in four died of cold and starvation. 9 By 1860, the United States had grown to a nation of some thirty million mostly European descendants. 7 The Indian population at that time was perhaps in excess of one-quarter million, less than half what it had been when Samoset had shared corn with the starving Pilgrims at Plymouth Rock. 7 
Brief Sioux History
From time immemorial, the Sioux inhabited the lush forests at the headwaters of the Mississippi River." French fur traders and Roman Catholic priests dealt successfully with the Sioux from the 1630s until the mid-1700s, when the Sioux were invaded by the Ojibwa Tribe, which was armed with European firearms." The Sioux retreated to the prairies and distant foothills of the Rocky Mountains. As the Sioux became accustomed to a new life-style in these regions, representatives from France, Spain, and later the United States proclaimed title to the same region, known then as Upper Louisiana. 4 Thomas Jefferson, who continued the tradition of the "Great White Father" begun by George Washington, by referring to the 66. Id., § 1. BROWN [Vol. 8 https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss2/11 SPECIAL RECENT DEVELOPMENT Indians as "my children" and "my son,"" 5 had been privately advocating an expedition across the Louisiana Territory since the Washington administration. 7 6 When the Louisiana Purchase was consummated with unexpected swiftness in 1803, Jefferson had already organized the Lewis and Clark expedition, which would peacefully encounter many Indian tribes, including the Sioux."' It is worth noting that the terms of the Louisiana Purchase required that the inhabitants of the territory be entitled "to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States" according to the principles of the Federal Constitution. 8 Presumably, this was not meant to include Indians.
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In 1805 the United States entered its first treaty with the Sioux, in which Lieutenant Zebulon Pike 0 obtained a grant from the Sioux for the purpose of the establishment of military posts, nine miles square at the mouth of the river St. Croix, also from below the confluence of the Mississippi and St. Peters, up the Mississippi, to include the falls of St. Anthony, extending nine miles on each side of the river. That the Sioux Nation grants to the United States, the full sovereignty and power over said districts forever, without any let or hindrance whatsoever. 8 In consideration of the above grants, the United States agreed to pay the Sioux $2,000, or the equivalent in merchandise."
The 
1980]
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The abrogation of the 1868 Treaty is the basis of this lawsuit." While an unbroken Indian treaty is a rarity, "a more ripe and rank case of dishonorable dealings will never, in all probability, be found in our history," 6 than the breaking of the Fort Laramie Treaty.
The army, at the direction of Congress and President Grant, unceremoniously violated the 1868 Treaty when it conducted a reconnaissance expedition into the Black Hills. 87 In 1874 Brevet Major General George Armstrong Custer led the mission and had prearranged to announce the discovery of gold. 8 This news brought a flood of miners to the Black Hills, which the Grant administration then used as justification for mew negotiations with the Sioux. 89 When commissioners appointed to the task failed to reach an agreement, they recommended that Congress fix a sum "as a fair equivalent of the value of the hills" and present it to the Indians as a finality." As the Supreme Court held, a fair equivalent was never paid."
The Court reached this conclusion by application of the Fort Berthold "good faith effort" test. 2 An objective inquiry into Congress' enactment of the 1877 Act led the Court of Claims to find that, "the terms upon which Congress acquired the Black Hills were not the product of any meaningful negotiation or arm's-length bargaining, and did not reflect or show any considered judgment by Congress that it was paying a fair price. ' " 93 Furthermore, "[tihe only item of 'consideration' that possibly could be viewed as showing an attempt by Congress to give the Sioux the 'full value' of the land the government took from them was the requirement to furnish them with rations until they became self-sufficient." 9 4 And finally, "[there is no indication that Congress believed that, or even considered whether, the obligation it assumed to furnish the Sioux with rations until they 
Litigation Chronology
From 1877 to 1920, the Sioux Indians were barred from suing the government. 9 " In 1909 the Sioux petitioned Congressman Eben Wever Martin, seeking payment for their pony herds which had been confiscated after Custer's defeat at the battle of Little Big Horn. Congressman Martin refused to get on the petition. 9 7 In 1923, pursuant to a special jurisdictional act, 9s the Sioux filed a petition in the Court of Claims. The case was not heard until 1942, when it was dismissed. 99 The extreme delay between the filing of the suit and the 1942 adjudication can only be attributed to the combination of the Great Depression and the political turbulence preceding World War II, and the fact that the Sioux were less eager to seek money damages than the return of the land,' 0 0 the latter being beyond the power of the court." 0 108. Section 70a of the Indian Claims Commission Act establishes five categories of wrongs made compensable under its terms, none of which authorizes payment of interest: "(1) claims in law or equity arising under the Constitution, laws, treaties of the United States, and Executive orders of the President; (2) all other claims in law or equity, including those sounding in tort, with respect to which the claimant would have been entitled to sue in a court of the United States if the United States was subject to suit; (3) claims which would result if the treaties, contracts, and agreements between the claimant and the United States were revised on the ground of fraud, duress, unconscionable consideration, mutual or unilateral mistake, whether of law or fact, or any other ground cognizable by a court of equity; (4) claims arising from the taking by the United States, whether as the result of a treaty or cession or otherwise, of lands owned or occupied by the claimant without the payment for such lands of compensation agreed to by the claimant; and (5) 
Six criteria relating to the determination of a political question are enunciated in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) : "Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question." Each of these criteria has had some degree of applicability to Indian claims; see text accompanying the following notes for examples of each: (1) note 42 supra; (2) note 27 supra; (3,4) notes 147-149 infra; (5) note 116 supra; and (6) Justice Rehnquist is probably correct when he says, "I am convinced that Congress may not constitutionally require the Court of Claims to reopen this proceeding .... "I However, his opinion in this instance is not entirely inconsistent with the majority holding, for while Congress certainly could not compel the Court to readjudicate the Sioux claim, nor any other previously litigated case,' 28 there can be no doubt that the Supreme Court has the power to accept a waiver of res judicata by Congress, and relitigate a claim if it chooses.' 29 Rehnquist, the lone dissenter, [Vol. 8 https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss2/11 SPECIAL RECENT DEVELOPMENT would not be compelled to reexamine a "question previously decided by an Art. III Court."' 3 0
The majority in Sioux Nation carefully considered the directive of Public Law 95-243 to determine if it constituted a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. This inquiry is pursued by the Court on two levels.' 31 The first is whether "Congress impermissibly has disturbed the finality of a judicial decree by rendering the Court of Claims' earlier judgments in this case mere advisory opinions."' 32 The second is whether Congress "overstepped its bounds by granting the Court of Claims jurisdiction to decide the merits of the Black Hills claim, while prescribing a rule for decision that left the Court no adjudicatory function to perform."' 33 The Court concluded that "neither of the two separation of powers objections described above is presented by this legislation."' 3 4
While the government chose not to argue the defense of res judicata before the Supreme Court, it did raise the claim in the 1975 Court of Claims.' 3 5 However, when Justice Rehnquist says that the Court of Claims "found no basis for relieving the Sioux from the bar of res judicata..
.,,,16 he fails to mention that there was no discussion of whether the Court had the power to accept a congressional waiver of res judicata, but merely whether the 1942 Court of Claims had taken jurisdiction and reached its decisions on the merits of the Black Hills taking claim.' 37 For if it did not, res judicata would not apply.'
38
The 1975 Court of Claims was obviously annoyed as to this question when it responded to the 1974 Indian Claims Commission. It held that, "The Commission really imputes a gross impropriety to this court,"' ' 39 because the 1974 Commission con- In the end, the best I can make of the 1942 opinion is that the terms of the jurisdictional act were so entangled in the court's mind with its ultimate determination adverse to the Indians on the Fifth Amendment claim that the Government should fail in its current defense of res judicata. The "jurisdictional" component seems to me to have been too large a factor in the 1942 holding to preclude the Nation from its right to show now that the acquisition of the Black Hills was a Fifth Amendment taking, without just and adequate compensation, rather than merely a violation of fair and honorable dealings. I am not persuaded that in 1942 the Indians had the opportunity to present their Fifth Amendment claim to a tribunal which deemed itself fully empowered to decide all aspects of that demand on their merits.' (2) "Congress may recognize its obligation to pay a moral debt."' 4 3 (3) Where Congress is "to all intents and purposes the defendant," it is not an invasion of the judicial power to "come into court... and say that they will not plead the former trial in bar, has never been questioned. The reports of the court are replete with cases where Congress, impressed with the equitable justice of claims which have been rejected by the court on legal grounds, has, by special act, waived defenses of the Government which prevented recover. and conferred jurisdiction on the court to again adjudicate the case. In such instances the court proceeded in conformity with the provisionfiof the act of reference and in cases, too numerous for citation here, awarded judgments to claimants whose claims had previously been rejected." Richardson v. United States, 81 Ct. Cl. 948, 957 (1935) . nor interpose the legal objection which defeated a recovery before ... "I"
Given this holding by the Supreme Court, there is no reason why any Indian claim previously adjudicated by the Indian Claims Commission, the Court of Claims, or the Supreme Court itself could not be relitigated, if Congress waives res judicata. As might be expected, there is a catch-22: the precedential value of holdings pursuant to special jurisdictional acts, such as Sioux Nation, and all other Indian Claims Commission holdings, "may be limited to the jurisdiction conferred by those acts." '45 And, of course, whether Congress chooses to waive res judicata is a political question.
The Political Question Doctrine
When the Court of Claims dismissed the Sioux's Black Hills suit in 1942, it cited Beecher v. Wetherby. ' 6 "Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the Government."' 7 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,'" 8 upon which the government relied heavily in the Black Hills case, also cites Beecher v. Wetherby at length, echoing the notion that Indian affairs are not subject to judicial review." 9 Before 1946, suits by Indian tribes, other than those under special jurisdictional acts, were generally limited to equitable jurisdiction, as "injunctive remedy was the only one available" to the tribes. ' After 1946, when Congress established the Indian Claims Commission, the courts had less reason to hold that Indian affairs were beyond the scope of judicial inquiry. However, there remained two monumental barriers to the cause of the Indians. The first is -the principle that Congress may unilaterally abrogate Indian treaties.' This is analogous to the rule that Congress may enact legislation inconsistent with treaties between the United States and foreign nations and, likewise, Congress may enter treaties with foreign nations inconsistent with existing legislation." 5 2 While the appearance of uniformity is preserved, unilateral abrogation of Indian treaties fails to honor the unique trust relationship between the United States and the various Indian tribes." 3 A second barrier, and even more devastating to the tribes' quest for justice, has been the presumption that whenever Congress enacts legislation pursuant to its trust responsibility, it is acting "in perfect good faith" for the benefit of the tribes." 4 For example, in Sioux Nation, the government argued that, "A disposal of tribal property in the discharge of this responsibility to manage the property for the tribe's benefit is an act on behalf of the tribe and, in effect, a disposal by the tribe."' 5 5 It was further argued that, "In our view, the true rule is that Congress must be assumed to be acting within its plenary power to manage tribal assets if it reasonably can be concluded that the legislation was intended to promote the welfare of the tribe."'
It is difficult to imagine how the confiscation of the Black Hills, with its billions of dollars in gold, silver, uranium, and other natural resources' 57 could be called management "to promote the welfare of the tribe." As Cardozo said in another Indian "taking" case, "Spoilation is not management."'1 5 Nevertheless, convoluted logic of this type has prevailed over our Indian brothers for three centuries. Subjugation of the tribes has resulted not only from the sword and gun, but from the rule of law, which in their case is accurately described as "the whim of the sovereign."159
The Supreme Court has always proceeded with extreme caution in the face of opposition from the political branches of government, i.e., the legislative and executive departments. [Vol. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss2/11 SPECIAL RECENT DEVELOPMENT has been described as "the most serious crisis in the history of the Court,"'' Chief Justice John Marshall formulated the concept of the trust relationship between the United States and the Indians.
They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to its guardian.' 6 2
Marshall's decision in Cherokee Nation has been compared to his decision in Marbury v. Madison,' 6 3 where the Chief Justice established the fundamental constitutional law principle of judicial review. 64 In each case, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction, partly because the authority of the Supreme Court was open to some question. In the follow-on case to Cherokee Nation, Worcester v. Georgia,' 5 Chief Justice Marshall was more assertive. There, the Court overturned two Georgia indictments on the ground that the state of Georgia had no jurisdiction on Cherokee land.' 6 6 For his courage, Marshall was rebuffed; the Court's order was never enforced. President Jackson defiantly proclaimed, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it." 1 6 7
Nevertheless, the Cherokee Nation decision remains at the heart of the federal-Indian relationship. The guardian-ward concept has been expanded by the courts and is described as "moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust."' 6 8 Yet the concept of the trust relationship enunciated by Marshall in Cherokee Nation has been used by Congress as a springboard to expanded powers over Indians. The Court has consistently held that the tribes were incapable of prudent management of their 161 In the exercise of the war and treaty powers, the United States overcame the Indians and took possession of their lands, sometimes by force, leaving them an uneducated, helpless and dependent people, needing protection against the selfishness of others and their own improvidence. Of necessity, the United States assumed the duty of furnishing that protection, and with it the authority to do all that was required to perform that obligation and to prepare the Indians to take their place as independent, qualified, members of the modern body politic.' 7 ' While Sioux counsel acknowledged "the underlying constitutional authority of Congress to manage and dispose of Indian property for their best interests,"' 2 they urged the Court to reject the "presumption that any legislation by Congress was intended to promote the welfare of the Sioux .... ,,I'3
The Supreme Court, in a significant departure from the command of Lone Wolf, held that the Lone Wolf Court's conclusive presumption of congressional good faith was based in large measure on the idea that relations between this Nation and the Indian tribes are a political matter, not amenable to judicial review. That view, of course, has long since been discredited in takings cases, and was expressly laid to rest in Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks.' 74 
The Standard of Review and Fiscal Considerations
It is an inescapable conclusion that the courts have struggled to formulate a special standard of review for Indian claims under the fifth amendment just compensation clause which would not "distribute any undue share of the nation's wealth to the Indians."'5
In The biggest reason for the disparity is the matter of interest. Under the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment, interest is a recognized component,' 8 ' even for Indian claims.' 82 When 5 percent interest is added to a 100-year-old claim, for example, the result is an award multiplied fivefold. However, not all Indian land claims are cognizable under the fifth amendment;' 3 furthermore, the Indian Claims Commission Act, by its terms, establishes legal and equitable grounds of recovery, but is silent on the question of interest. 8 4 to give the Indians the full value of their lands when the government acquired it, we therefore look to the objective facts as revealed by Acts of Congress, congressional committee reports, statements submitted to Congress by government officials, reports of special commissions appointed by Congress to treat with the Indians, and similar evidence relating to the acquisition. As hereinafter shown, this is the kind of evidence upon which we have relied in reaching our conclusion in this case.
The "good faith effort" and "transmutation of property" concepts referred to in Fort Berthold are opposite sides of the same coin. They reflect the traditional rule that a trustee may change the form of trust assets, as long as he fairly (or in good faith) attempts to provide his ward with property of equivalent value. If he does that, he cannot be faulted if hindsight should demonstrate a lack of precise equivalence. On the other hand, if a trustee (or the government in its dealings with the Indians) does not attempt to give the ward the fair equivalent of what he acquires from him, the trustee to that extent has taken rather than transmuted the property of the ward. In other words, an essential element of the inquiry under the Fort Berthold guideline is determining the adequacy of the consideration the government gave for the Indian lands it acquired.' 94 While the Supreme Court found this test "a standard that ought to be emulated," ' 95 the Fort Berthold test has been severely criticized. 96 The dissenting opinion in the 1979 Court of Claims states that the Fort Berthold standard "makes a mockery out of the fifth amendment. . ".. ",9 This paper will not pursue that contention, for while the "good faith effort" test is arguably more stringent than the normal standard' 8 for fifth amendment violations, its application in Sioux Nation resulted in a finding of a fifth amendment taking. 
